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January
2 to June 22, 1863
Following the Battle of Stones River on January 2, 1863, both the Union
Army of the Cumberland and the Confederate
Army of
Tennessee began the process of preparing for their respective next moves.
In order to counteract the geographic
obstacle of the Highland Rim, a band of small hills
averaging 700 feet in height that bisects the campaign
corridor to
Chattanooga and traversed only by a series of gaps,
Union commanding general William S. Rosecrans broke his
army into three components, attempting to combine
deception with rapid movement to position himself below
the Rim and out maneuver the Confederate Army. Once over the Rim Rosecrans
could then concentrate on climbing the 2000 ft.
escarpment of the Cumberland Plateau.
To hold the Army of Tennessee in the
entrenchments in the Shelbyville-Wartrace area, part of
the Union force would be sent directly south to
threaten Guy’s and Liberty Gaps (one division of Gordon
Granger’s Reserve corps along with Alexander McCook’s XXth Corps and one division from
George Thomas’ XIV Corps). As
part of this process, Rosecrans would also send
two divisions of Crittenden’s corps eastward through
Gillie’s Gap as a feint, designed to
convince Bragg that the main effort was
coming directly down the Shelbyville Turnpike. Finally, the main
attack
would be delivered by Thomas’ corps at Hoover’s Gap and then proceed quickly southward
to Manchester (McCook’s divisions were to follow Thomas
through Hoover’s Gap as soon as they had finished their
diversion at
Liberty Gap, while Crittenden’s divisions
were to
move to Manchester as soon as they moved over
Gillie’s—Granger, with Baird’s division, would be left
in the Shelbyville area). Once the bulk of Rosecrans’
army arrived in Manchester, the Union force would be
closer to the Confederate army main base—Tullahoma—than
the Army of Tennessee itself would be if it remained in
Shelbyville. Rosecrans could then destroy the
Confederate force in detail if it attempted to back to its base, or move further south to the Elk River
area and cut them off from a retreat to Chattanooga.
Bragg’s troops were positioned to
facilitate the Union Army's every move. Although
spread in a line running from Columbia to McMinnville,
much of this distance was covered by the various units
of Confederate cavalry (and much of this dispersion was
done for logistical reasons—to avoid foraging too
heavily in one area). The two corps of infantry
were concentrated in the Shelbyville-Wartrace area,
positioned behind entrenchments. For logical
reasons, Bragg needed to be sure he covered the direct
rail and road line running south through the area of
Shelbyville and Tullahoma, and the end of the Rim on the
west left him vulnerable to attack on open ground on his
left, but also negated the major reason for posting
himself below the Highland Rim in the first place.
Troop Dispositions on
June 22
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